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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,1 Professors Judy M. Cornett and Michael H. 
Hoffheimer identify a number of legal issues that will become the focus of 
litigation after Daimler.2 This Response identifies an additional, perhaps 
surprising issue that is currently being litigated in the wake of Daimler AG v. 
Bauman. In the lower federal courts, defendants who have litigated cases on 
the merits without raising lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense are filing 
motions to dismiss and arguing that they are not subject to general jurisdiction 
in the forum under Daimler’s “at home” standard. The question is whether 
these defendants have waived their jurisdictional defense under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12 because it was “available” to them in 2011 after 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Oberlin College; 
M.P.P., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1 Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: 
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015). 
 2 See id. at 136‒55 (stating that the following issues will become the focus of 
litigation after Daimler: whether appointment of an agent for purposes of service of process 
can constitute effective consent to either specific or general jurisdiction, the scope of 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, the proper application of Daimler’s comparative approach, the 
role of corporate expectations in general jurisdiction, the identification of “place of 
incorporation” and “principal place of business,” and the “exceptional circumstances” that 
will render a corporation “essentially at home” somewhere other than its place of 
incorporation and principal place of business).  
Originally published in 76 Ohio St. L.J. Furthermore 67 (2015).
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Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown3 was decided.4 This 
Response explains the doctrine of waiver under Rule 12 and examines three 
cases that have addressed waiver under Goodyear and Daimler.5 This 
Response then asserts that defendants who failed to argue that they were not 
“at home” in the forum after Goodyear waived their jurisdictional defense and 
should not be permitted to raise it under Daimler. 
II. WAIVER OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS A DEFENSE UNDER RULE 12 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), lack of personal 
jurisdiction is a “threshold defense” that is “waived if [it is] not included in a 
preliminary motion under Rule 12 as required by Rule 12(g) or, if no such 
motion is made, [is] not included in the responsive pleading or an amendment 
as of right to that pleading under Rule 15(a).”6 This Rule is not absolute, 
however. If the defendant omits a personal jurisdiction defense from a Rule 
12(b) motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading because it was unavailable at 
the time, then he does not waive it.7 He can assert the new defense in a second 
Rule 12(b) motion or in his answer,8 but he must raise it “as soon as [its] 
cognizability is made apparent.”9 Although the case law in this area is sparse, 
                                                                                                                     
 3 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 4 This issue first came to my attention in an email sent by Professor Kevin M. 
Clermont to the Civil Procedure Listserv on Thursday, Oct. 2, 2014. The discussion on the 
Listserv prompted me to write this Response on the topic of waiver and pointed me 
towards several cases that are cited herein. 
 5 The three cases are (1) Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 8 
F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014), (2) American. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 4471606 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014), and (3) 
Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 6 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1391, at 498 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (g), (h)(1)). 
 7 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that 
makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a 
defense . . . that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”) (emphasis 
added); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(A) (stating that a party waives the defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction by “omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 
12(g)(2)”); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491 (“A significant 
qualification on the application of Federal Rule 12(g) is that a party is only required to 
consolidate Rule 12 defenses and objections that are ‘then available to the party.’”); Glater 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that the “language of Rule 
12(g) logically also applies to Rule 12(h) with the result that under that subsection 
defendants do not waive the defense of personal jurisdiction if it was not available at the 
time they made their first defensive move”). 
 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491‒92 (stating that a party can file a 
second motion to dismiss “based on a defense that he or she did not have reasonable notice 
of at the time that party first filed a motion to dismiss or on a defense that became available 
only after a motion had been made under Rule 12” or “assert the newly revealed 
defense . . . in the responsive pleading”). 
 9 Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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the courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that a defense is 
unavailable under Rule 12(g)(2) “if its legal basis did not exist at the time of 
the answer or pre-answer motion.”10 In other words, a defendant does not 
waive a threshold defense where “for all practical purposes” binding precedent 
makes it “impossible” for the defendant to raise it in his first response to the 
complaint.11  
In Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, an oft-cited waiver case, the Second 
Circuit found that the defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense 
because the defense became available only after the U.S. Supreme Court 
overruled controlling Second Circuit authority.12 In Holzsager, the plaintiff 
sued the defendant hospital in 1976 and established jurisdiction over it by 
attaching an insurance policy issued to the defendant by a New York insurance 
company.13 At the time, Seider v. Roth, a decision from the Court of Appeals 
of New York, authorized “the exercise of personal jurisdiction through quasi-
in-rem attachment of insurance policies issued by resident insurers.”14 Despite 
criticism of Seider-type jurisdiction and Supreme Court precedent that called 
its constitutionality into question,15 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Seider in 
1978 in O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.16 Then, in Rush v. Savchuck, “the 
Supreme Court declared Seider-type attachments unconstitutional.”17  
Shortly thereafter the defendant in Holzsager moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responded that the defendant had 
waived its jurisdictional defense.18 The Second Circuit first held that the 
defendant did, in fact, timely assert a personal jurisdiction defense that was 
broad enough to include the argument that jurisdiction under Seider was 
unconstitutional.19 Nevertheless, the court concluded that even if the defendant 
had not previously raised its personal jurisdiction defense, it would not have 
                                                                                                                     
 10 Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 813 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing 
Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796; Glater, 712 F.2d at 738–39). 
 11 See id.; Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 793–96; see also Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas 
Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2009). In the context of a Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief from a judgment, the First Circuit has similarly held that it “will excuse a 
party for failing to raise a defense only when the defense, if timely asserted, would have 
been futile under binding precedent.” Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 
2004). Generally, it is “futile” to raise a defense “only if (i) at the time of the procedural 
default, a prior authoritative decision indicated that the defense was unavailable, and (ii) 
the defense became available thereafter by way of supervening authority (say, an 
overruling of the prior decision or a legislative clarification).” Id. 
 12 Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796. 
 13 Id. at 794. 
 14 Id. (citing Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966)). 
 15 Id. at 795 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)). 
 16 Id. (citing O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1034 (1978)). 
 17 Id. (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)). 
 18 See Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 795. 
 19 Id. at 795–96. 
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waived the defense under Rules 12(g) and (h). The court reasoned that the 
legal basis for the defense did not exist until the Supreme Court overruled 
O’Connor in Rush, and a right that is unknown cannot be waived.20 According 
to the Second Circuit, “[t]he clairvoyance demanded by [the] plaintiff . . . of 
the [defendant was] inconsistent with the doctrine of waiver.”21 
Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, a maritime 
attachment lawsuit, the Second Circuit said that “the doctrine of waiver 
demands conscientiousness, not clairvoyance, from parties.”22 In Hawknet, the 
plaintiff argued that the defendant could not raise its personal jurisdiction 
defense on appeal because it had failed to raise it in the district court.23 The 
court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument generally, but held that waiver was 
inapplicable on the facts of the case because controlling Second Circuit 
precedent had prevented the defendant from raising its jurisdictional defense in 
the district court.24 It was not until the Second Circuit overruled that precedent 
while the Hawknet appeal was pending that the defendant had “a new 
objection to the District Court’s jurisdiction over it.”25 In these circumstances, 
the appellate court concluded that the defendant did not waive its personal 
jurisdiction defense by raising it for the first time on appeal.26  
III. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: THE CASE LAW 
Currently, the lower federal courts are wrestling with the question of 
whether Daimler AG v. Bauman provides defendants with a jurisdictional 
defense that was unavailable before Daimler was decided on January 14, 2014, 
or whether that defense was waived by the defendants’ failure to quickly assert 
it after the Supreme Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. 
Brown in 2011. In these cases, the initial complaint was filed long before 
Daimler was decided, but the defendants did not raise personal jurisdiction as 
a defense. In particular, they did not argue that general personal jurisdiction 
was lacking because they were not “at home” in the forum under Goodyear. 
Then, shortly after the decision in Daimler, the defendants moved to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that Daimler had changed the 
law of general personal jurisdiction and under Daimler they were not “at 
home” in the forum. The plaintiffs responded that the defendants had waived 
their defense under Rule 12(g)(2) by failing to timely assert it.  
In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, for example, 
the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on April 18, 2001, against the Palestinian Interim 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See id. at 796 (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143, 145 (1967)). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 23 Id. at 91 & n.8 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) for the proposition “that a party 
can waive its right to challenge the district court’s personal jurisdiction over it”).  
 24 See id. at 91–92. 
 25 Id. at 92. 
 26 Id. 
Vol. 76] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 71 
Self-Government Authority (PA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
and eleven individual defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.27 The PA and PLO filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the district court denied 
in 2006.28 They did not formally raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a 
defense until February 10, 2014, when they filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings for lack of personal jurisdiction29 and argued that under Daimler 
“their contacts with the District of Columbia [did] not render them ‘at home’” 
there.30  
Similarly, in American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, the plaintiff filed suit on November 1, 2011, in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma.31 The defendant moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim in response to both the initial and second amended 
complaints but did not raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in either 
motion.32 The court denied the defendants’ second 12(b)(6) motion on 
December 26, 2013, and the defendant filed an answer on January 10, 2014.33 
The defendant then moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on 
March 3, 2014, and argued that general jurisdiction was lacking in light of 
Daimler.34 Like the defendants in Gilmore, the defendant in American Fidelity 
argued that Daimler changed the law and created a new legal basis for 
challenging general personal jurisdiction.35 More specifically, the defendant in 
American Fidelity argued that it was subject to general jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma before Daimler because it had continuous and systematic contacts 
with Oklahoma and controlling Tenth Circuit authority prevented it from 
raising general jurisdiction as a defense until after Daimler was decided.36 The 
defendant further argued that it was not subject to general jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma after Daimler because it was neither incorporated nor had its 
principal place of business there.37 
In both Gilmore and American Fidelity, the district courts held that the 
defendants had waived their jurisdictional defense by failing to assert it 
promptly after Goodyear.38 Both courts reasoned first and most significantly 
that the defense of lack of general personal jurisdiction was available to the 
defendants after Goodyear because Goodyear, not Daimler, announced the 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 28 Id. at 12. 
 29 See id. at 12–14. 
 30 Id. at 15. 
 31 Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 
WL 4471606, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at *1, *2–3. 
 35 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1. 
 36 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1, *2–3.  
 37 Id. at *2. 
 38 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *5. 
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new “at home” rule and the Daimler Court merely applied it.39 Second, both 
courts found, contrary to the defendants’ arguments, that Justice Sotomayor 
did not state in her concurrence that the “at home” rule itself was novel.40 
Rather, she said that the majority’s interpretation of the “at home” rule—
“namely that a foreign defendant’s contacts with the forum must be ‘viewed in 
comparison to the company’s nationwide and worldwide activities,’”—was 
novel and unprecedented.41 This part of the majority’s holding, however, was 
not at issue in either of the district court cases.42 
Finally, both the Gilmore and American Fidelity courts examined the 
lower courts’ treatment of the Goodyear decision. The Gilmore court noted 
that more than 250 federal cases discussed the “at home” standard in the 
period between the Goodyear and Daimler decisions.43 Similarly, the 
American Fidelity court pointed out that the circuit courts have concluded that 
Daimler reaffirmed Goodyear’s “at home” standard for general personal 
jurisdiction over corporations and “have not presumed general jurisdiction is 
lacking if the corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of 
business is not in the forum state.”44 The American Fidelity court also rejected 
the defendant’s argument that pre-Goodyear Tenth Circuit precedent 
prevented it from raising its jurisdictional defense until after Daimler was 
decided because controlling circuit precedent from 2012 “clearly relie[d] upon 
the ‘at-home’ standard announced in Goodyear” and “existed . . . well before 
the Supreme Court’s Daimler decision.”45 In the end, both the Gilmore and 
American Fidelity courts held that the defendants had forfeited their general 
personal jurisdiction defenses and denied their motions to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. 
In contrast, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, the Second Circuit held 
on similar facts that a non-party had not waived its jurisdictional defense.46 In 
                                                                                                                     
 39 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (stating that the defendants were “flat-out wrong that 
Daimler was the genesis of the [at home] rule” because that “standard was unmistakably 
announced in Goodyear”); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *3 (stating that “multiple 
statements by the Court in Daimler demonstrate that the [at home] standard . . . was clearly 
first expressed in Goodyear”). 
 40 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4. 
 41 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 
770 (2014)); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4. 
 42 See Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 14–15 (noting that the defendants specifically argued 
that their contacts with the forum did not render them at home in the District of Columbia); 
Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (stating that Justice Sotomayor “was addressing a 
holding of the Court not relied upon by [the] Defendant”). 
 43 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 16. 
 44 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (citing Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova 
Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2014); Snodgrass v. Berklee Coll. of Music, 559 
F. App’x 541, 542 (7th Cir. 2014); Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15). 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li , 768 F.3d 122, 125‒29, 134‒36 (2d Cir. 2014); 
see also Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 2015 WL 1499185 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) 
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Gucci, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York on June 25, 2010.47 The district court issued a 
preliminary injunction that explicitly applied to a non-party foreign bank, and 
the plaintiffs served the bank with the injunction at its New York City branch 
in July of 2010.48 In 2011 and 2012, the district court ordered the bank to 
comply with the injunction and denied the bank’s motions to modify the 
injunction and for reconsideration.49 The bank appealed.50 After oral argument 
in the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Daimler and the bank raised 
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction for the first time.51 Relying on 
Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, the Second Circuit held that the 
bank was not subject to general jurisdiction in New York because its contacts 
were not “so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in 
the forum.”52 It had “only four branch offices in the United States and only a 
small portion of its worldwide business is conducted in New York.”53  
In reaching its decision, the Gucci court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that the bank had waived its jurisdictional defense by failing to raise it in the 
district court.54 The court held that the defense was unavailable in the district 
court because it would have been directly contrary to controlling Second 
Circuit precedent for the bank to argue that it was not subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in New York before Daimler was decided.55 The court 
explained in a footnote that Daimler and the Supreme Court’s other general 
jurisdiction cases are applicable to non-parties.56 At the same time, however, 
the court pointed out in a different footnote that the bank was not subject to the 
waiver provisions in Rules 12(g) and (h) because it was a not a “‘party’ that 
could fail to assert its personal jurisdiction defense in an answer or a motion to 
dismiss.”57  
                                                                                                                     
(finding under Gucci that a 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was not available before 
Daimler, but holding that several defendants have nonetheless waived their jurisdictional 
objection by waiting for seven months after Daimler was decided to raise it). 
 47 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 126. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 127–28. 
 50 Id. at 128. 
 51 See id. at 134–35. 
 52 Id. at 135 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n.19 (2014)).  
 53 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135. 
 54 See id. at 135, 136 & n.14. 
 55 See id. at 135–36 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 
(2d Cir. 2000)); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 
1985); Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 16, 2000)); see also supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (discussing Hawknet, 
Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies). 
 56 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 134 n.13. 
 57 Id. at 136 n.14. 
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IV. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: AN ANALYSIS 
Gilmore and American Fidelity Assurance Co. raise the intriguing 
question of when the Rule 12 threshold defense of lack of personal jurisdiction 
should be deemed “unavailable” so that failure to raise it in the first response 
to the complaint does not result in its waiver under Rules 12(g) and (h). The 
limited circuit case law in this area suggests that this exception to Rule 12’s 
waiver doctrine is applicable only where controlling legal authority makes it 
impossible to raise the defense in a pre-answer motion or answer.58 This 
standard itself suggests that a defense is unavailable under Rule 12 if it would 
violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for the defendant (or his 
attorney) to assert it. In other words, if the defense is not “warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law,” then it is “unavailable” 
and not subject to waiver.59 At the same time, however, if a new rule is 
announced and the controlling authority is overruled or called into question, 
the defendant must assert his jurisdictional defense promptly or he will forfeit 
it.  
The narrow reach of this exception is appropriate given the purpose of 
Rule 12’s waiver provisions, “which is the avoidance of time-consuming, 
piece-meal litigation of pre-trial motions.”60 Unless this exception is carefully 
circumscribed, defendants will frequently argue that a threshold defense was 
unavailable to them and therefore their failure to timely raise it should be 
excused. Moreover, there is no reason that a different standard should apply to 
a non-party once the non-party is on notice that it has become a participant in 
the litigation, as the bank in Gucci was once it was served with an injunction. 
The efficiency concerns that drive Rule 12’s waiver provision apply equally to 
pre-trial motions by non-parties. 
Under the waiver standard set forth above, the defendants in Gilmore and 
American Fidelity and the non-party bank in Gucci waived their jurisdictional 
defenses by failing to assert them promptly after Goodyear was decided 
because there was no controlling authority that made it impossible for them to 
raise their jurisdictional defenses.61 Indeed, the Goodyear decision provided 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See supra notes 12–28 and accompanying text. 
 59 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (stating that when an attorney presents a defense to the 
court, he is certifying that “to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the defense is “warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 
law or for establishing new law”). 
 60 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1391, at 506 (quoting Tiernan v. Dunn, 295 F. 
Supp. 1253 (D.R.I. 1969)). 
 61 Although Rule 12 was inapplicable to the non-party bank in Gucci, the Second 
Circuit appeared to apply the Rule 12 waiver standard set forth above when it held that the 
bank had not waived its jurisdictional defense because controlling Second Circuit 
precedent prevented the bank from raising it until after Daimler was decided. See Gucci, 
768 F.3d at 135–36. 
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defendants with a legal basis to argue that general jurisdiction was lacking 
because they were not “at home” in the forum.  
Prior to Goodyear, the law regarding general jurisdiction over 
corporations “was so well settled that large corporations . . . did not even 
challenge general jurisdiction over them.”62 Thus, when the lawsuits in 
Gilmore and American Fidelity were filed and the bank in Gucci was served 
with the injunction, it was unlikely that the defendants or the bank could have 
raised general personal jurisdiction as a defense.63 After Goodyear, however, 
the law was unclear. The Goodyear Court “articulated a new standard” and 
“adopted a more restrictive approach” to general jurisdiction when it 
announced the “at home” rule, but it did not explain how narrowly that rule 
should be applied.64 While the Goodyear Court indicated that a corporation is 
subject to general jurisdiction at its place of incorporation and principal place 
of business, “the opinion did not restrict general jurisdiction to those 
‘paradigm’ places.”65 Moreover, the Court’s “evaluation of the sales” in 
Goodyear suggested “that the Court might adopt a comparative approach 
under which contacts outside the state might reduce the likelihood that a 
corporation’s in-state activity would constitute a home in the state.”66 Not 
surprisingly “[c]ourts and commentators reached different conclusions about 
whether the place where a corporation was ‘at home’ after Goodyear included 
places where it engaged in substantial activity outside its place of 
incorporation or principal place of business.”67 Given the uncertainty in the 
law after Goodyear, there was no legal authority that made it futile for 
defendants to raise their jurisdictional arguments until after Daimler was 
decided. 
In contrast, in Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, a case where the Second 
Circuit found that the defendant did not waive its jurisdictional defense under 
Rule 12, the personal jurisdiction doctrine at issue there had been criticized 
and called into question by the Supreme Court but was then reaffirmed by the 
Second Circuit.68 Thus, it was impossible for the defendant to raise its 
personal jurisdiction defense until the Supreme Court overruled the controlling 
                                                                                                                     
 62 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 104. 
 63 The district courts in Gilmore and American Fidelity did not identify the 
defendants’ contacts with the forums in those cases, but it seems likely they did not have 
an argument against general personal jurisdiction until after Goodyear was decided. In 
Gucci, however, it was clear that the bank’s contacts with New York subjected it to general 
jurisdiction there under pre-Goodyear authority, and, therefore, it would have been 
pointless for the bank to argue that it was not subject to general jurisdiction until after 
Goodyear was decided. See Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135–36. 
 64 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 105–06, 127. 
 65 Id. at 6. The argument that general jurisdiction over corporations should be 
restricted to the place of incorporation and principal place of business originated in the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s amicus brief in Goodyear. Id. at 6 n.17. 
 66 Id. at 23. 
 67 Id. at 23 n.60 (citing various sources). 
 68 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
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Second Circuit authority in Rush v. Savchuk.69 Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v. 
Overseas Shipping Agencies, a maritime attachment case cited by the Gucci 
court, the Second Circuit held that controlling precedent made it impossible 
for the defendant to raise its jurisdictional defense until the Second Circuit 
overruled that case law while the Hawknet appeal was pending.70  
In American Fidelity, the defendant tried to argue that pre-Goodyear Tenth 
Circuit authority made it impossible to raise a jurisdictional defense until after 
Daimler was decided.71 The district court rejected the defendant’s argument, 
however, because controlling Tenth Circuit precedent from 2012 “clearly 
relie[d] upon the ‘at-home’ standard.”72 In contrast, in Gucci the Second 
Circuit held that the bank had not waived its jurisdictional defense because it 
would have been directly contrary to controlling Second Circuit authority for 
the bank to raise it pre-Daimler.73 To support this statement, the court cited 
three pre-Goodyear decisions from the Second Circuit that “made it clear that 
a foreign bank with a branch in New York” was subject to general jurisdiction 
there.74 In one of those cases, Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., the 
Second Circuit concluded that general jurisdiction was not available under 
New York’s long-arm statute but did not reach the constitutional issue.75  
Moreover, the Gucci court neglected to cite or discuss the import of 
Second Circuit cases decided in between Goodyear and Daimler that clearly 
recognized the “at home” standard.76 Perhaps most significantly, the Gucci 
court did not cite any Second Circuit cases in between Goodyear and Daimler 
that applied the at home standard and specifically held that a defendant or non-
party with contacts similar to those of the bank in Gucci was subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in New York. And notably, the court did not mention 
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, A.S., a Second Circuit case decided 
only a few months before Gucci in which the court said that both Goodyear 
and Daimler “make clear that even a company’s ‘engage[ment] in a 
                                                                                                                     
 69 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 70 See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
 71 See Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 
2014 WL 4471606, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 135, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 74 Id. at 136 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d Cir. 
2000)); see Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
16, 2000)). 
 75 Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 57–58. 
 76 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 674 (2d. Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 
(2011)) (proposing that the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a 
corporation is where it is “fairly regarded as at home”); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese 
Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 169 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting the “at home” rule 
from Goodyear); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 n.9 
(2d Cir. 2012) (same). 
Vol. 76] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 77 
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ is alone insufficient 
to render it at home in a forum.”77 
Thus, despite the pre-Goodyear authority relied upon by the Second 
Circuit in Gucci and contrary to the Gucci court’s holding, it was not 
impossible for the bank to raise a jurisdictional defense after Goodyear. 
Because the law of general jurisdiction over corporations was unclear after 
Goodyear and it was uncertain just how much the Court had narrowed that 
doctrine, a legal basis existed to argue that general jurisdiction was lacking. 
The bank in Gucci had four branch offices in the United States and conducted 
only a limited amount of its business in New York.78 After Goodyear, it was at 
least arguable on those facts that the bank was not “at home” in New York. Put 
differently, if the bank had raised its 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense under 
Goodyear, it would not have violated Rule 11(b)(2) because the argument that 
the court lacked general personal jurisdiction over it was warranted by existing 
law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending existing law. The defense 
therefore was available before Daimler was decided.79 Thus, under the Rule 
12 waiver standard the bank in Gucci, like the defendants in Gilmore and 
American Fidelity, waived its jurisdictional argument by failing to assert it 
quickly after Goodyear.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Because Daimler AG v. Bauman was decided over one year ago, the 
specific issue raised by this Response—whether a defendant who failed to 
raise a general personal jurisdiction defense under Goodyear can assert it 
under Daimler—will eventually become moot. Nevertheless, the broader 
question of when a threshold defense is “unavailable” under Rule 12 deserves 
additional scholarly attention given the dearth of case law in this area and 
especially in light of cases like Gucci. Instead of evaluating whether Goodyear 
made it possible for the bank to make a jurisdictional challenge, the Gucci 
court essentially held that a jurisdictional argument was unavailable because 
no controlling authority explicitly held that an entity like the bank was not 
subject to general jurisdiction until Daimler was decided. If courts take this 
approach to determining whether threshold defenses under Rule 12 are 
unavailable, defendants will be more likely to raise these defenses later in 
litigation and thereby seriously undermine the purpose of Rule 12’s waiver 
doctrine. 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)). 
 78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
